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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant J. Pochynok 
Co., will be referred to herein as "Pochynok Company" and the appellees Gregory and 
LouAnn Smedsrud will be referred to herein as the "Smedsruds". 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER POCHYNOK COMPANY, AS 
THE ONLY PARTY AWARDED RELIEF BY THE JURY AT THE 
TRIAL OF THIS MATTER, IS THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-1-18 AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App 
344, 1f 5, 994 P.2d 206 (quoting State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994)). 
Whether and the extent to which attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness. Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 
1252 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). When a trial court's rulings are based upon a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced 
a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a 
proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
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1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 
157, 129 Pac. 519(1912). 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney Fees (R. 387-389); 
Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And Attorneys' 
Fees (R. 435-459); Plaintiffs Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 469-
470); Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Award Of Attorney's 
Fees And Costs And In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney's 
Fees (R. 572-592); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs 
And Attorneys Fees (R. 544-554); Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For 
Award Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (R. 567-571); Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In 
Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 598-609); 
Minute Entry Ruling (R. 621-622); Judgment Upon Verdict And Order On Post Trial 
Motions (R. 635-640); Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 650-651); 
Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 652-
666); Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment 
(R. 667-686); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To 
Amend Judgment (R. 706-718); Minute Entry Ruling (R. 726-727); and Order Denying 
Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 729-731). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER THE RECENT VERSION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31-1-18, WHICH WAS MODIFIED BY ADDING THE 
"OFFER OF JUDGMENT" LANGUAGE DURING THE COURSE OF 
THIS LITIGATION, IS APPLICABLE TO THIS MATTER? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: An appellate court will review the 
lower court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of 
law under a correctness standard. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 
(Utah 1997). 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Plaintiffs Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 469-470); 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees 
And Costs And In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney's Fees 
(R. 572-592); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And 
Attorneys Fees (R. 544-554); Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs 
Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 598-609); Minute Entry Ruling (R. 
621-622); and Judgment Upon Verdict And Order On Post Trial Motions (R. 635-640). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER CONSTRUCTION FUNDS WHICH 
ARE DEPOSITED BY A PROJECT OWNER INTO A GENERAL 
CONTRACTOR'S BANK ACCOUNT, WHICH ACCOUNT WAS 
CREATED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE PROJECT OWNER'S PROJECT, 
AND WHICH FUNDS WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY THE 
PROJECT OWNER TO BE PAID TO SPECIFIC SUBCONTRACTORS 
WHO HAVE COMPLETED WORK ON THE PROJECT, ARE FUNDS 
OWNED BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND THEREFORE 
SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S 
JUDGMENT CREDITORS? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: An appellate court will review the 
lower court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and its Conclusions of 
law under a correctness standard. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 
(Utah 1997). With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court will 
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review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard; however, the legal 
effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and no deference need 
be given a lower court's resolution of such questions of law. Id. 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Request For Hearing (R. 724-725); Minutes - Objection To Garnishment (R. 
728); Combined Rule 59 Motion For New Trial And Notice Of Objection To Order (R. 
746-747); Memorandum In Support Of Combined Rule 59 Motion For New Trial And 
Notice Of Objection To Order (R. 749-765); Affidavit Of John Pochynok (766-769); 
Ruling On Writ Of Garnishment (776-779); Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To 
Combined Rule 59 Motion For New Trial And Notice Of Objection To Order (793-800); 
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Combined Rule 59 Motion For New Trial And Notice 
Of Objection To Order (R. 805-809); Affidavit Of Brett D. Cragun (R. 810-812); Minute 
Entry Ruling (R. 818-819); and Order On Motion For New Trial And Objection To Form 
Of Order (R. 849-851). 
STATUTES WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-18. Attorneys1 fees — Offer of judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs 
in the action. 
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not 
entitled to recover attorneys' fees under Subsection (1). 
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter 
may make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more 
favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the 
offeror after the offer was made. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below 
Pochynok Company, a general contractor, brought suit against the Smedsruds 
seeking to recover damages for breach of a construction contract and to foreclose its 
mechanics lien. The Smedsruds asserted a counterclaim also seeking damages for breach 
of the construction contract. Prior to the jury trial, the Smedsruds made an offer of 
judgment to Pochynok Company in the amount of $40,000.00. The offer of judgment 
was not accepted and the matter proceeded to trial. At trial, the jury found in favor of 
Pochynok Company awarding $7,076.56. The jury awarded nothing on the Smedsruds' 
claims. 
Pochynok Company and the Smedsruds each filed post trial motions asserting that 
they were the successful party at trial and sought costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-18. The Smedsruds argued that they were entitled to their 
attorney fees because they were the "successful party" in the litigation in accordance with 
§ 38-1-18(1). Moreover, the Smedsruds asserted that there were entitled to their attorney 
fees and costs under § 38-1-18(3) because the amount of the jury award was lower than 
the Smedsruds' offer of judgment. 
Pochynok Company responded to the Smedsruds' claims by contending that the 
"offer of judgment" language, which was added to the statute during the course of this 
litigation, was not applicable to this case because the change to the statute was a 
substantive rather than procedural change. Pochynok Company further argued that the 
"offer of judgment" provision of the statute was of no consequence even if it was 
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retroactively applied to this case, because as the only party to be awarded by the jury, 
Pochynok Company was in fact the "successful party" in the litigation, and therefore 
entitled to its attorneys fees under § 31-1-18(1). The jury award when combined with 
Pochynok Company's attorney fees that Pochynok Company was entitled to under the 
statute, exceeded the offer of judgment made by the Smedsruds. Consequently, 
attorneys' fees would not be available to the Smedsruds under subsection (3). 
The trial court ruled that the present version of § 31-1-18 was applicable to the 
case, that the Smedsruds were the successful parties at trial, and therefore the Smedsruds 
were entitled to their costs and attorneys fees. A Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment 
was subsequently filed by Pochynok Company. The motion was denied by the trial court. 
The Smedsruds subsequently sought to garnish funds in Pochynok Company's 
bank account. Pochynok Company opposed the garnishment on the basis that the funds 
in Pochynok Company's account were owned by Pochynok Company's then current 
project owner, which project owner had deposited the funds into the account with the 
direction that subcontractors who had completed work on the project be paid with those 
funds. In fact, the checking account had been established by Pochynok Company 
specifically for this project owner's development. Moreover, the funds were disbursed 
into Pochynok Company's account with specific direction by the project owner to pay 
designated subcontractors, and Pochynok Company had in fact issued checks to pay those 
subcontractors before the Writ Of Garnishment was served on Pochynok Company's 
bank. Notwithstanding the fact that the funds could be directly traced to the project 
owner, and despite the fact that those funds had been designated by the project owner to 
6 
pay subcontractors, and had not been commingled with any other funds, the trial court 
found that the garnishment was proper. Pochynok Company filed a Rule 59 motion for 
new trial on the garnishment issue. The trial court denied this motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In this action, Pochynok Company brought a breach of construction 
contract claim against the Smedsruds and sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien on real 
property owned by the Smedsruds. (R. 1-8) 
2. On May 9, 2002, pursuant to § 38-1-18(3), the Smedsruds submitted an 
offer of judgment to Pochynok Company in the amount of $40,000.00. (R. 408) 
3. The "offer of judgment" language was added to § 38-1-18(3) during the 
course of this litigation. (See footnote to Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953)) 
4. The Smedsruds' offer of judgment was not accepted by Pochynok 
Company. (R. 391 at^5) 
5. The matter was presented to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. (R. 249-250) 
6. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Pochynok Company in the amount of $7,076.56. (R. 354-355) 
7. Pochynok Company and The Smedsruds both filed post-trial motions 
requesting attorneys fees on the basis that each respective party was the "successful 
party" in the lien foreclosure action pursuant to § 38-1-18(1). Pochynok Company and 
the Smedsruds also contested whether the newly enacted subsection (3) to § 38-1-18 was 
retroactively applicable to this case. (R. 387-389, 435-459, 469-470, 544-554, 567-592, 
598-609, 650-686, and 706-718) 
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8. Notwithstanding the fact that jury returned a verdict in favor of Pochynok 
Company and against the Smedsruds, the trial court ruled in favor of the Smedsruds, 
finding that the Smedsruds were the successful party and therefore entitled to recover 
their costs and fees. (R. 621-622 and 726-727) 
9. Judgment was entered in favor of the Smedsruds on August 13, 2002. 
Pochynok Company's Motion To Amend Judgment was denied on October 7, 2002. (R. 
635-640 and 729-731) 
10. On September 12, 2002, funds in a Pochynok Company bank account were 
garnished by the Smedsruds in the amount of $37,585.00. (R. 703-705) 
11. Prior to the garnishment being filed, on September 6, 2002, the owner of 
Pochynok Company's then current construction project wired $35,253.49 into Pochynok 
Company's account. This account was established to be used solely with this owner's 
project. (R. 762, 766-769) 
12. Before the September 6, 2002 wire was received, the balance in Pochynok 
Company's account was approximately $3,307.66. After the wire was received, 
Pochynok Company's account balance was approximately $38,461.18. (R. 766-769) 
13. On September 6, 2002, the project owner sent Pochynok Company a wire 
confirmation. This confirmation set forth the total amount of money that was wired into 
the account, and designated which subcontractors were to be paid with the construction 
funds. (R. 760, 766-769) 
14. Between September 7, 2002 and September 12, 2002, no deposits were 
made into Pochynok Company's account. (R. 768) 
15. On September 10, 2002, Pochynok Company disbursed checks payable to 
two subcontractors in amounts totaling $29,500.00. These checks bounced because the 
money in Pochynok Company's account was garnished. (R. 766-769) 
16. The construction funds which were garnished were not owned by Pochynok 
Company, and were provided by the project owner to be used to pay for work that had 
been completed on the owner's project. (R. 766-769) 
17. Because of the garnishment, the owner's funds which were intended to be 
used to pay the subcontractors were diverted to the the Smedsruds, and were therefore not 
available for payment as directed by the project owner. (R. 766-769) 
18. The trial court denied Pochynok Company's objection to the garnishment, 
and subsequent request for new trial on the garnishment issue. (R. 728 and 849-851) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it determined Pochynok Company was not the 
successful party in the litigation. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-18(1), "Except as 
provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter, the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." The Utah 
decision of A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002) explains that determining the prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees and 
costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if plaintiff is awarded 
a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an 
adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed. In this matter, Pochynok Company sued 
Q 
defendant for money damages and Pochynok Company was awarded judgment. The 
Smedsruds recovered nothing on their claims for breach of contract. Accordingly, 
Pochynok Company is the successful party and is entitled to recover its attorneys fees 
pursuant to § 31-1-18(1). 
Subsection (3) of § 31-1-18 is not applicable in this matter. Subsection (3) of § 
31-1-18 was added to the statute during the course of this litigation. Under Utah law, 
substantive changes in legislation only operate prospectively. See discussion in Wilde v. 
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) and Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 Ut. App. 75 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2002). As such, the "offer of judgment" language contained in subsection 
(3) should not be applicable to this case. 
The trial court erred when it allowed the garnishment of the funds in Pochynok 
Company's bank account. The construction funds which were garnished in this matter 
were not owned by Pochynok Company. According to the decision in Peterson v. 
Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1977), the fact that funds are held in a bank account titled 
in another person's name, does not necessarily mean that the owner of the bank account 
owns the funds inside of that account. As Pochynok Company did not own the funds in 




WHETHER POCHYNOK COMPANY, AS THE ONLY PARTY AWARDED RELIEF 
BY THE JURY AT THE TRIAL OF THIS MATTER, IS THE "SUCCESSFUL 
10 
PARTY" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-1-18 AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS? 
The trial court erred when it determined the Smedsruds were the successful party 
in this litigation. At trial, Pochynok Company was the only party that received a 
recovery from the jury. The jury awarded the Smedsruds nothing on their claims. Under 
Utah statutory law, the successful party in litigation involving a mechanic's lien is 
entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) provides as follows: 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
The Utah Court Of Appeals decision in Whipple, provides guidance on the scope 
and meaning of the term "successful party" in § 38-1-18. Whipple at 94. In Whipple, the 
court stated that the terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" are synonymous. 
Whipple at 96. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "prevailing party" as: "A party 
in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the damages awarded." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999). When defining a "successful party," Black's 
Dictionary refers to the definition of prevailing party. Id. Under Utah decisions, a 
successful party includes, but is not limited to, one who successfully enforces or defends 
against a lien action. Reeves v. Steinfelt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
Palombi v.D& C Builders, 452 P.2d 325, 327-328 (1969). 
Under the Utah Court of Appeals decision in J. V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 
971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), a lien claimant's prima facie evidence establishing 
11 
its right to attorneys' fees is met by showing that it is the prevailing party in the 
mechanics' lien cause of action. 
The Whipple court quoted from the Mountain States1 decision, which stated that 
typically, determining the prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees and costs is 
quite simple. Whipple at 95. The court explained, "Plaintiff sues defendant for money 
damages; if plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant 
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed." Id. This 
is the analysis which should be employed in the "typical" type case that was before the 
trial court. Because Pochynok Company was awarded $7,076.56 by the jury, and 
defendant was awarded nothing, Pochynok Company, by definition, was the prevailing or 
successful party. As the successful party, Pochynok Company is entitled to recover its 
attorneys' fees. The trial court erred in determining that the Smedsruds was the 
successful party in this matter. 
ISSUE 2 
WHETHER THE RECENT VERSION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-1-18, WHICH 
WAS MODIFIED BY ADDING THE "OFFER OF JUDGMENT" LANGUAGE 
DURING THE COURSE OF THIS LITIGATION, IS APPLICABLE 
TO THIS MATTER? 
Subsection (3) of Section 38-1-18 does not apply to this case. The trial court ruled 
that the Smedsruds were entitled to attorney's fees under subsection (3) of Section 38-1-
18 of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law, a subparagraph added in 2001, effective April 30, 
2001. 
1
 Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-556 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
19 
When subparagraph (3) was added and became effective, this matter was then 
pending, the complaint having long been filed respecting work performed by Pochynok 
Company for the Smedsruds, for which Pochynok Company filed a Notice of Claim of 
Lien on October 19, 1999 about a year and a half before the statute was amended. 
Subparagraph (3) of § 38-1-18 plainly affects substantive or vested rights in that it 
creates, defines and regulates rights and duties which may give rise to a cause of action 
by creating a method by which a contracting party defending against a mechanic's lien 
may recover post offer costs and fees against the mechanic's lien claimant if "the 
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable" than "an offer of 
judgment" made by the defending party. While a procedural step is involved—that of 
making an offer of judgment, the statute plainly affects substantive rights. It plainly 
establishes a primary right not in existence at the time Pochynok Company's claim arose. 
Such substantive legislation operates only prospectively. See discussion in Wilde v. 
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) and Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 Ut. App. 75 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2002).2 
2
 Wilde v. Wilde cites an earlier appeal in the same case, Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1998) and Department o/Soc. Servs v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). 
The first Wilde opinion held that a statutory amendment which conditioned modification 
of alimony on a showing of "extenuating circumstances" regulated the right to receive 
alimony and changed the law substantively and was not simply a different mode or form 
of procedure for enforcing existing rights, did not merely clarify the meaning of an earlier 
enactment. Because that change was substantive, it was held not to apply except 
prospectively. Adding subparagraph (3) to Section 38-1-18, was plainly a substantive 
change which operates only prospectively and does not change the rights of the parties as 
they existed when the work was done, the lien was filed and then suit was filed to 
foreclose the lien. 
n 
Even if the amendment was valid and did apply to this earlier filed case, the 
Smedsruds would not be entitled to attorney's fees by reason of the Smedsruds 
unaccepted offer of a $40,000.00 judgment because the judgment to which Pochynok 
Company is entitled exceeds that offer in any event. 
The verdict of the jury was $7,076.56. The reasonable attorney's fee award to 
which plaintiff is entitled as the successful party under Section 38-1-18(1), and which is 
fully supported by the affidavit of Pochynok Company's counsel was over $35,000.00. 
The total judgment that should be entered is therefore in excess of $40,000.00 plus 
Plaintiffs costs, e.g., "more favorable" than the offer. 
ISSUE 3 
WHETHER CONSTRUCTION FUNDS WHICH ARE DEPOSITED BY PROJECT 
OWNER INTO A GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S BANK ACCOUNT, WHICH 
ACCOUNT WAS CREATED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE PROJECT OWNER'S 
PROJECT, AND WHICH FUNDS WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY THE 
PROJECT OWNER TO BE PAID TO SPECIFIC SUBCONTRACTORS WHO HAVE 
COMPLETED WORK ON THE PROJECT, ARE FUNDS OWNED BY THE 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT BY THE 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S JUDGMENT CREDITORS? 
The trial court erred when it ruled that the funds in Pochynok Company's account 
were subject to garnishment by the Smedsruds. The funds that were deposited into 
plaintiffs account were owned by the project owner, and were to be used to pay for work 
which was completed on the owner's project. Pochynok Company had a duty under Utah 
Statute §57-55-603(1) to pay the money deposited by the project owner to the designated 
subcontractors. 
14 
The money deposited into Pochynok Company's account was not a gift to 
Pochynok Company, nor was it payment for services that Pochynok Company had 
provided on the project. There was no transfer of ownership of the funds, and Pochynok 
Company never had an ownership interest in those funds. Prior to the wire into 
Pochynok Company's account, the account balance was less than $3,500.00. No deposits 
were made into Pochynok Company's account between that date of the September 6, 
2002 wire and the date of the garnishment. Immediately after the garnishment, Pochynok 
Company's account had a negative balance. It is therefore clear that the money in 
Pochynok Company's account was placed there by the project owner. In fact, the 
account was created and used only for this particular owner's project. As is established 
by the Utah Supreme Court decision in Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1977), 
the fact that funds are held in bank account titled in another person's name, does not 
necessarily mean that the owner of the bank account owns the funds inside of that 
account. Here the project owner obviously owned the money in the account that he 
designated be paid to the designated subcontractors. The trial court erred when it allowed 
the Smedsruds to garnish another party's money. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Pochynok Company respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the ruling of the trial court that the Smedsruds were the successful party 
herein, reverse the trial court's ruling that §38-1-18(3) should be retroactively applied in 
this matter, and reverse the trial court's ruling that garnishment herein was proper. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ' day of April, 2003. 
15 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
Attorneys For Plaintiff/Appellant 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant 
was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to 
said individuals at the following address this ^ / day of April, 2003. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD 
LOUANN SMEDSRUD 
7100 Canyon Drive 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 020901328 MI 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD, et al, : Date: July 25, 2002 
Defendant(s), 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit filed July 19, 2002 and Notice to Submit filed July 19, 
2002, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees, etc. 
is granted for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief, etc. and its 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, etc. are denied for the 
reasons specified in the opposing memoranda. 
3. Counsel for the prevailing parties to prepare the 
appropriate orders. 
Case No. 020901328 MI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 25th day of July, 2002, I sent by first 
class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document to the 
following: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East 
Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
3098 Highland Drive 
Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
£ Zx. 
District Court Deput^ f Qlerk 
IMAGED
 flUB 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
sssasaBr 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
t) V TS 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND 
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS 
02010133$ 
Civil No.-0006e000tT* 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. Prior to trial, all crossclaims 
between defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud and Pella Products, Inc. had been dismissed 
with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court. In addition, all claims of 
548588vl 
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plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against defendants Blaze Wharton Construction, Inc. and 
Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure prior to trial. 
On May 22, 2002, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, 
Inc. and against Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56. The jury 
returned no verdict in favor of any other party hereto. 
Following trial, both parties submitted motions for award of costs and attorneys fees 
incurred in the action. In addition, the plaintiff submitted a motion for injunctive relief, asking 
that this Court enjoin defendants from asserting claims or initiating legal proceedings against 
Wynn G. Yelland, Paul V. Nesseth and Locus Architecture, Ltd., by reason of Mr. Yelland 
having agreed to appear and testify at trial herein. 
The Court having reviewed the parties' post-trial motions and supporting submittals, 
being fully advised, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, adjudged and decreed as follows: 
1. The motion of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud to tax costs and 
attorneys fees is granted for those reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive Relief is denied, for those reasons set out in 
defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Injunctive Relief. 
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3. Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs is denied for those 
reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Tax Costs 
and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Tax Costs and 
Attorneys Fees. 
4. Based upon the foregoing rulings and upon the jury verdict in this matter, final 
judgment is hereby entered as follows: 
a. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and 
against defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Lou Ann Smedsrud, jointly and 
severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest thereon from and 
after May 22, 2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of 12% per annum. 
b. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants Gregory and LouAnn 
Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., 
in the following amounts: 
i. $ 1,906.94, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred prior to 
May 9, 2002; 
ii. $48,083.10, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred prior 
to May 9,2002; 
iii. $766.50, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred on and 
after May 9, 2002; 
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iv. $33,280.00, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred on 
and after May 9, 2002; and 
v. Interest on the foregoing amounts from and after May 22, 2002 
until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12%. 
c. It is further ordered that the award of defendants' costs and attorneys fees 
as set out above may be augmented in an amount equal to all costs and attorneys 
fees incurred by defendants' from and after June 1,2002 in the enforcement 
and/or collection of the judgment entered herein, upon further application as 
supported by affidavit of defendants' counsel. 
5. Plaintiffs petition for an order of foreclosure of its mechanic's lien herein is 
denied, as its judgment against Smedsruds, as the owners, is fully offset by judgment in favor of 
Smedsruds herein. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of liens placed by or for 
it upon the Smedsruds' residence located in Summit County, State of Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
All of Lot 118, PINERIDGE SUBDIVISION, according to the 
official plat thereof filed in the office of the Recorder of Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
(hereafter "Smedsrud Property'). Plaintiff is hereby declared to hold no right, title or interest in 
and to the Smedsrud Property. Plaintiff is further ordered to release any and all Notices of Lis 
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Pendens filed against the Smedsrud Property with the Summit County Recorder's office in 
connection with this action. 
7. Defendants Butterfield Lumber, Inc., Pella Products, Inc., Blaze Wharton 
Construction, Inc., Dixie Woodworks, Inc., and Jeffrey Kaiser, having failed to present any proof 
to the court in support of any claims which they have or may have against any party hereto, or to 
obtain any verdict or judgment in their favor, are determined to hold no right, title or interest in 
and to the Smedsrud Property, whether jointly or severally, by virtue of any right of mechanic's 
lien asserted by or on behalf of said defendants (or any of them) against the Smedsrud Property. 
Said defendants are hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of mechanics' or 
materialman's lien placed by or for them upon the Smedsrud Property. 
8. Any and all claims asserted by or against any party to this action, to the extent not 
otherwise addressed in this judgment and order, are hereby deemed dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
DATED this l^jf day of August, 2002. 
BYTI 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j v day of August, 2002,1 caused to be hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed form of JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND 
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS 
American Plaza II, ste. 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Ste. 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 020901328 MI 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD, et al, : Date: September 19, 2002 
Defendant(s), : 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit filed September 18, 2002, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment is in reality an 
effort to have this Court reconsider its previous decisions 
incident to the judgment of August 13, 2002 which this Court 
declines to do. 
Case No. 020901328 MI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 19th day of September, 2002, I sent by 
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr. 
4685 Highland Drive 
Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Randall R. Smart 
341 South Main Street 
Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive 
Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
57 West 200 South 
Suite 105, American Plaza II 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
District Court Deputy/ Clerk 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
Defendant, AMEND JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN : 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, : Civil No. 020901328 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON : 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
DLXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; : 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO : 
GRANDE PAINTING, : 
Defendants and Counterclaim : 
Plaintiffs. : 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment in the above-entitled matter having been 
submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, the Court having 
reviewed the parties' submittals, and good cause appearing, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. to 
amend judgment in the above-entitled matter be and hereby is denied. 
DATED this i^_ dayo ,2002. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^7-^ day of>2^^»_, /2002,1 caused to be mailed by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of Order Denying 
Motion to Amend Judgment, to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
Arnold & Wiggins 
American Plaza n, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J POCHYNOK COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
OBJECTION TO GARNISHMENT 
Case No: 020901328 MI 
Judge: J DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: October 7, 2002 
Clerk: cindyb 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): MR. POCHYNOK 
Defendant(s): GREGORY SMEDSRUD 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRETT D. CRAGUN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VINCENT C RAMPTON 
DAVID MCGRATH 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:13-9:24 
HEARING 
Plaintiff's Objection to Garnishment is argued to the Court and 
denied for the reasons stated on the record, 
prepare the appropriate order. 
Attorney Rampton to 
P f l f l P 1 f l a o f l 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim RULING ON WRIT OF 
Defendant, GARNISHMENT 
vs. : 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN : 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, : 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, : Civil No. 020901328 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON : 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; : 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO : 
GRANDE PAINTING, : 
Defendants and Counterclaim : 
Plaintiffs. : 
Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud having caused a Writ of 
Garnishment to issue in the above-entitled proceeding, directed to Zions First National Bank as 
Garnishee; said Writ having been served September 10,2002, upon Zions First National Bank; 
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Zions First National Bank having served its answers to interrogatories incident to said Writ upon 
Defendants, and upon the Plaintiff-in-judgment Debtor, J. Pochynok Company, Inc., on 
September 13, 2002; and Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. having filed a Request for Hearing 
pursuant to Rule 64D(h), Utah R. Civ. P., the Smedsrud Defendants' Writ of Garnishment was 
called on for hearing by the Court on October 7, 2002, at 9 a.m. Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, 
Inc. was represented by its counsel of record, Brett D. Cragun. The Smedsrud Defendants were 
represented by their counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough. 
The Court having heard presentations of counsel, having reviewed all submittals of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. has failed to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Writ of Garnishment was issued improperly; that the answers to 
interrogatories are inaccurate; or that any assets garnished thereby are exempt from or are not 
subject to garnishment; 
2. Plaintiffs Request for Hearing was untimely; 
3. Plaintiffs objections to the Writ of Garnishment are therefore declined; 
4. All assets identified in the answers to interrogatories of Garnishee Zions First 
National Bank are subject to garnishment and not exempt; 
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5. Zions First National Bank, as Garnishee, is hereby ordered to pay the Property 
Subject to Garnishment, as identified in its answers to interrogatories in response to the 
Smedsrud Defendants' Writ of Garnishment, directly to counsel for Defendants Gregory and 
LouAnn Smedsrud. 
DATED this day of October, 2002. 
BYTH 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By:. 
Brett D. Cragun 
Attorneys for Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of October, 2002,1 caused to be mailed by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed RULING ON 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
Arnold & Wiggins 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 / 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 020901328 MI 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD, et al, : Date: November 5, 2002 
Defendant(s), : 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit filed November 4, 2002, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Combined Rule 59 Motion, etc. is denied 
for the reasons specified in the opposing memorandum. 
2. Counsel for defendants Smedsrud to prepare the order. 
Case No. 020901328 MI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 5th day of November, 2002, I sent by 
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive 
Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
fV. VWVQ' 




-JO *^'< VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AND OBJECTION TO FORM 
OF ORDER 
Civil No. 020901328 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc.'s Combined Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and 
Notice of Objection to Order having been submitted for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration; the Court having reviewed the submittals of the parties, and 
good cause appearing, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Combined Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and 
Notice of Objection to Order, both in connection with this Court's hearing of Plaintiff s objection 
to Defendants' Writ of Garnishment herein, is denied. 
DATED this Ifl/ day of November, 2002. 
BY ihm COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of November, 2002,1 caused to be mailed by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL AND OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
Arnold & Wiggins 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
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